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1. Introduction
In November 2004, the European Commission es-
tablished a Working Group responsible for setting 
up basic standards and the structure of the CCCTB. 
The main objectives of the CCCTB Working Group 
were the following: discuss about principles that 
will govern the CCCTB, examine the technical defi-
nition of a common consolidated tax base for com-
panies in more than one Member State, establish 
fundamental structural elements of a consolidated 
tax base and formulate a mechanism for the alloca-
tion of the consolidated tax base between different 
Member States. The CCCTB proposal aims to en-
able a simplified tax system for companies. It would 
reduce tax compliance costs and remove existing 
tax obstacles that companies face when they oper-
ate in several Member States. 
The CCCTB is a system of common rules for com-
puting the tax base of companies which are tax resi-
dents in the EU and in EU-located branches of third 
country companies (COM, 2011: 121). A central 
feature of the CCCTB is cross-border consolidation 
and setting up a single rule that companies operat-
ing within the EU could use to calculate their tax-
able profits. The CCCTB regime ensures cross-bor-
der gain and loss offset and reduces operating costs 
in the long run. All of the above can be achieved 
through formula apportionment. The key benefit 
of the implementation of the formula apportion-
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ment method among the tax system of EU Member 
States is the avoidance of double taxation and the 
prevention of income shifting. The main aim of its 
introduction is to establish tax profits and losses of 
international companies that have subsidiaries in 
different Member States. It would offer a possibility 
to cover profits and losses in order to reach com-
mon results of operations among companies. The 
overall taxable income, calculated in such a man-
ner, would be assigned to individual Member States 
through a sharing mechanism. The introduction 
of a new consolidation and apportionment system 
would have two effects (Devereux and Loretz, 2007: 
2). First, loss-making companies could benefit from 
international loss consolidation to the extent that 
they could offset losses against contemporaneous 
profits made by other companies within the same 
group in other countries. Second, the effects of the 
apportionment of group taxable profit to specific 
Member States depends on where the profit is allo-
cated and the set of tax rates consequently applied.
Furthermore, the main aim of the paper will be 
explained, and the manner in which the formula 
apportionment impacts income distribution and 
tax burden will be succinctly discussed. Moreover, 
advantages and disadvantages of the CCCTB and 
some basic principles of the CCCTB and the Euro-
pean Commission’s point of view will be presented, 
as well as the methodology for the calculation of the 
formula apportionment and implementation of the 
CCCTB system in Croatia.
2. Advantages and disadvantages of the 
CCCTB system
The introduction of the CCCTB would compensate 
trans-border income among Member States. Such 
an income tax base emphasizes economic benefits 
because consolidated companies could use their 
overall economic potential in both Croatia and any 
other Member State. By applying the CCCTB, the 
profit or loss realised by funds transfers within a 
group is postponed until it is realized on the real 
market. Costs and corresponding revenues from 
transactions are then calculated within the group 
on the market. After the introduction of this system 
in all Member States, expected benefits would in-
clude (COM, 2001: 16):
1. Significant reduction of compliance costs;
2. Disappearance of the double taxation problem 
within the EU;
3. Removing a major obstacle to the free move-
ment of capital and unrestricted exercise of the 
right of establishment, through cross-border 
loss compensation of tax losses by reducing tax-
able profits of parent companies;
4. Disappearance of tax avoidance practices by us-
ing transfer pricing because inter-firm transac-
tion prices can not affect the distribution of tax-
able income to tax jurisdictions;
5. Comparability of effective tax burdens in each 
jurisdiction resulting in an improvement in the 
quality of investment and hence of resource al-
location to the whole EU.
The European Commission and the CCCTB system 
representatives are certain that the new system will 
offer numerous advantages to both international 
companies and the overall European economy. 
Such advantages include a decrease in expenses of 
harmonization and simplification of procedures, 
possibility to consolidate the company’s incomes 
and losses in the community, increased transpar-
ency, decrease of tax uncertainty and increase in 
economic efficiency, elimination of discrimination, 
elimination of double taxation and prevention of 
non-taxation and misuse. The EU, as a whole, will 
benefit the most from consolidation when the sys-
tem becomes compulsory and the tax rates harmo-
nised (Van der Horst et al., 2007: 31).
The Commission’s decision to support the intro-
duction of the CCCTB system is based upon the as-
sumption that, for example, the common tax base 
advantages of such a system take into consideration 
its weaknesses as well. Potentially negative conse-
quences include loss of national tax systems, loss of 
fiscal policy instruments for regulation of relations 
on the national market, reduction of system advan-
tages due to problems in the taxation of incomes 
that European companies make outside the EU, and 
decrease of budget revenues from corporate taxa-
tion. If all countries join the CCCTB reform, this 
benefit will be partly offset by two possible nega-
tive effects (Bettendorf et al., 2010: 475). The first is 
due to the mechanical reallocation of the tax base, 
which depends on the choice of the formula. The 
second is induced by the factor reallocation towards 
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low-tax countries. High-tax countries suffer from 
an outflow of production factors by multinationals 
towards low-tax countries because corporate tax 
rates work as excises on formula factors. Under a 
common consolidated base taxation, all or a group 
of Member States would agree on a set of common 
rules for establishing a taxable base of certain enter-
prises (Weiner, 2007: 521).
2.1 Principles of the CCCTB system
The CCCTB must provide a comprehensive and au-
tonomous set of rules. According to Freedman and 
Macdonald (2007: 7) the role of principles should 
be twofold. From one point of view, they should 
provide both a reference point for determining the 
scope of the tax base through a legislative state-
ment of a central concept which encompasses the 
substantive nature of the tax base. From another 
point of view, a constitutionally valid framework is 
the form of criteria for interpreting and applying the 
provisions of the Directive.
The principles are essentially normative standards 
applied in designing the tax system of each country. 
The common principles of the CCCTB are in line 
with the general principles of the tax system. These 
principles are vertical and horizontal equity, effi-
ciency, effectiveness, simplicity, transparency and 
certainty, consistency and coherence, flexibility and 
enforceability. In a tax system, the vertical equity 
principle implies that the burden of taxation should 
be shared in accordance with the taxpayers′ respec-
tive ability to pay. In horizontal equity, taxpayers in 
the same economic circumstances should receive 
equivalent treatment. An EU CCCTB would aim 
to provide equity between countries as part of the 
consolidation process and the subsequent sharing 
of the tax base between countries (European Com-
mission, 2004: 4). Capital Export Neutrality (CEN) 
and Capital Import Neutrality (CIN) are concepts 
whose aim is to ensure neutrality (European Com-
mission, 2004: 4). Vital elements of tax systems are 
principles of effectiveness, simplicity, transparency 
and certainty, consistency, flexibility and enforce-
ability. Effectiveness is essentially the capacity of the 
tax base to achieve its basic objectives. The princi-
ples must also be certain and clear, relating to the 
transparency requirement. General principles are 
viewed from a national perspective; therefore, the 
CCCTB Working Group still needs to clarify in de-
tail how these principles will be considered in a de-
finitive or final way.
2.2 European Commission’s point of view of the 
CCCTB system
In order to prevent or eliminate existing tax obsta-
cles in cross-border activity, the European Commis-
sion presented a proposal for a common consoli-
dated tax base through which it wishes to support 
business activities of multinational companies. 
Based on that system, taxation will not depend on 
either constituent of separate accounting nor on the 
principle of arm’s length transactions, but rather 
it will be based on common European accounting 
rules. This system is in fact an additional tax regula-
tion with common rules for all member states. One 
of its goals is to eliminate tax planning, especially 
loss compensation due to separate accounting, debt 
financing and intergroup transactions (Schreiber, 
2012: 117). 
According to Pirvu, Banica and Hagiu (2011: 220) 
the main advantage of such a system is that it can 
create conditions for achieving important objec-
tives of fiscal policy in the European Union. This can 
be achieved by supporting the success and develop-
ment of a common market, thus allowing all Mem-
ber States to compete fairly and have an advantage 
on the internal market, as well as sustainable reduc-
tion of the overall tax burden. A tax burden reduc-
tion ensures a balance between tax reductions, in-
vestments in the public sector and maintenance of 
fiscal consolidation. 
According to Wendt (2009: 104), based on the CC-
CTB system there are three scenarios:
1. “The first scenario is a “no-change”. This scenar-
io is left on one side, as it would imply that the 
CCCTB is condemned.
2. The second scenario consists of providing com-
panies with the possibility to opt for a Common 
Corporate Tax Base for the determination of 
taxable income resulting from their EU-wide 
activities. This scenario would not include a 
consolidation mechanism.
3. The third scenario would be the Common Con-
solidated Corporate Tax Base as originally in-
tended by the Commission”.
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According to this concept, three distinct steps are 
necessary to arrive at the tax base for each jurisdic-
tion (Wendt, 2009: 105):
1. “Each group member calculates its taxable prof-
its separately but according to the same set of 
rules;
2. The individual tax bases are aggregated to the 
consolidated tax base;
3. The consolidated tax base is allocated to differ-
ent Member States by applying specific factors 
(formula apportionment)”.
Table 1 shows possible scenarios of a common tax 
base and their potential to eliminate tax obstacles.
Table 1 Scenarios of a Common Tax Base and 
their potential to eliminate tax obstacles
Source: Wendt, 2009, p. 107.
The European Commission proposed a directive as 
a tool for introducing the proposed CCCTB system 
with specific rules for determining a single tax base. 
Thus, the Commission proposes that companies be 
given a choice of opting for the CCCTB system or 
the former system for calculating the tax base ac-
cording to national tax rules (European Commis-
sion, 2007a). The dilemma surrounding the manda-
tory or optional application of the CCCTB system 
and the consolidation of profits and loss has given 
rise to a divergence of opinions. An alternative so-
lution would be the mandatory application of the 
CCCTB system and the optional application of the 
consolidation of profits and loss. One possibility 
would be to leave the decision on mandatory or op-
tional application of the CCCTB and consolidation 
in the hands of each Member State. Therefore, the 
Commission provides for the possibility of letting 
companies choose whether they want to use the 
CCCTB system or not due to the diversity of en-
vironments in which individual companies operate.
The Directive would apply to EU companies and 
third country companies which are subject to cor-
porate income taxes in Member States of the Euro-
pean Union. Companies resident in the European 
Union would easily opt for the CCCTB system giv-
en that it would facilitate their business activities, 
but also companies not resident in the European 
Union which would use the system for their per-
manent establishments within the European Union. 
The option to choose this type of system would be 
valid for companies for 5 years and would be auto-
matically renewed for another 3 years at the end of 
the annual period (European Commission, 2007a). 
The proposed system primarily depends on its level 
of attractiveness and efficiency for companies. 
The proposed CCCTB system assumes a mandatory 
consolidation of profits and loss for all companies. 
These companies would include companies with a 
subsidiary or permanent establishment in another 
EU Member State (the ‘all-in’ or ‘all-out’ principle). 
Subsidiaries would have a total of 75% voting rights 
Tax Obstacle to
be Reduced Scenarios of a Common Tax Base
Common Corporate Tax Base
Harmonized Tax Accounting Rules 
Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base
Harmonized Tax Accounting Rules
+
Formula Apportionment




Except to the extent that Member States 





Transfer prices are still required for the 
division of the tax base
Achieved
Transfer pricing are only relevant if they affect 
the allocation formula (e.g. of based on sales)
Double Taxation Not achieved Achieved




But only if the tax treatment of reorganisa-
tions is harmonised
Achieved
But only if the tax treatment of reorganisations 
is harmonised
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owned directly or indirectly by a parent company or 
a group of companies. Groups of companies shar-
ing 50-75% ownership would not have the possibil-
ity to consolidate profits and loss. Consolidation 
would not be possible for subsidiaries and perma-
nent establishments from third countries since they 
already have permanent establishments in CCCTB 
countries (European Commission, 2007a)
The consolidated tax base would not include any 
profits and losses on intra-group transactions be-
tween members of the group (profits and losses 
on disposal of stock, fixed assets, etc.). Nor would 
it include intra-group provisions. This implies that 
only transactions between the group of companies 
and third parties, as well as other companies of the 
group not consolidating their tax base, have a tax 
effect (European Commission, 2007a). Any losses 
incurred by taxpayers before entering the CCCTB 
system would not be taken into account in the con-
solidation. “Such losses would be offset against the 
share of the future consolidated profits attributed 
to this taxpayer in accordance with national rules” 
(European Commission, 2007a: 26). When a tax-
payer leaves a group, the loss remains in the group. 
When a group terminates, then the loss of the group 
is attributed to the taxpayers belonging to the com-
pany.
The European Commission maintains that the in-
come of a taxpayer non-resident in the European 
Union would be subject to corporate income taxa-
tion under the worldwide principle. The CCCTB 
system would include equal treatment of income 
of EU companies and of third country companies. 
The income of companies located in a third country 
would be included in the tax base under the world-
wide principle while adhering to the rules for reliev-
ing double taxation. The tax base would be calculat-
ed on an annual basis for the period of 12 months, 
while the following rules would be used to calculate 
the tax base (European Commission, 2007a: 8): “The 
tax base of a company would be calculated as the 
difference between income subject to tax less ex-
empt income and deductible expenses and other 
deductible items”.
The definition of tax income would be based on 
international accounting rules. It would be broad 
so as to cover monetary or non-monetary income, 
including proceeds from business activities and as-
sets, interests, dividends, other profit distributions, 
subsidies, donations and compensation. Income 
such as subsidies directly linked to acquisition or 
improvement of a depreciable business asset, pro-
ceeds from the disposal of pooled assets and certain 
dividend and permanent establishment income and 
capital gains would be exempt.
Deductible expenses would mean all business-re-
lated expenses that are fully and exclusively neces-
sary for the production, maintenance and securing 
of taxable income. Along with costs of research and 
development, these would include costs related to 
debts for business purposes and other expenses. 
“Non-deductible expenses would mean profit dis-
tributions, repayments of equity and debt, any pay-
ment to and expenditure incurred for  the benefit of 
shareholders or related persons; expenses related to 
assets that are not necessary; 50% of entertainment 
and representation costs; appropriation of retained 
earnings forming a part of equity; bribes; fines and 
penalties payable to public authority for breach of 
any legislation; management costs; monetary gifts 
and donation (except to charitable bodies meeting 
certain criteria); and costs relating to the acquisi-
tion, construction or improvement of fixed assets 
except those relating to research and development” 
(European Commission, 2007a: 9).
It is very questionable whether the specific idea can 
be concretized and realized through the common 
consolidated tax base. There exist three different in-
terpretations of the harmonised tax base, with each 
of them presuming a different level of cooperation 
and elimination of tax obstacles in cross-border ac-
tivities within the European Union (Mijatović, 2012: 
92). At the minimal level would be a harmonised tax 
base built on a single set of tax and accounting rules. 
Although this system would reduce accounting 
costs, all other tax obstacles in cross-border activi-
ties would still remain. A harmonised tax base is the 
prerequisite for corporate tax relief for the current 
year due to the transfer of loss from the previous 
year in case of cross-border activity. Specific ac-
counting rules for determining foreign losses along 
with all other accompanying difficulties should also 
exist. In order to completely eliminate tax obstacles 
in cross-border activities, a consolidated tax base 
should be designed. In this consolidation scenario, 
the distribution of the total taxable income incurred 
by subsidiaries will no longer be able to be based 
on accounting prices. Rather, a distribution system 
should be established that would include the dis-
tribution of the total tax base to different Member 
States.
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The proposed CCCTB system would reduce harm-
ful tax competition and introduce anti-abuse regu-
lations for the protection of the CCCTB system tax 
base. The CCCTB system anti-abuse protection 
is structured on two levels in the form of general 
anti-avoidance rules (GAAR) and specific anti-
avoidance rules (SAAR). Some countries apply gen-
eral rules, while other countries implement specific 
rules. Regardless, many countries apply both sets of 
rules. Under the proposed CCCTB system, general 
rules aim to prevent fictitious transactions, i.e. such 
transactions are removed in order to calculate the 
tax base. Specific rules include: “thin capitalization 
rules or more general rules to limit the deductibility 
of interest, switch over rules from the exemption to 
the credit method, CFC rules, rules to re-character-
ise the scale of shares as a scale of assets to avoid the 
abuse of the consolidation rules in connection with 
the participation exemption, rules to avoid the pos-
sible double deductions (double dips) and  possible 
rules to avoid the manipulation of the factors in the 
Formulary Apportionment” (European Commis-
sion, 2008: 3). Specific rules for legal tax avoidance 
always come hand in hand with general rules on le-
gal tax avoidance and should be harmonised with 
the EC Treaty requirements. In 2011, 12 countries 
applied specific and thereby general rules for legal 
tax avoidance: Germany, France, United Kingdom, 
Sweden, Norway, Finland, Spain, Portugal, Den-
mark, Hungary, Estonia and Italy. Their common 
goal was to protect the domestic tax base from tax 
distortion. The harmonization of the corporate in-
come tax base within the CCCTB system is not the 
only objective; another objective is the harmoniza-
tion of regulations preventing tax avoidance in that 
system. 
Once the CCCTB system is introduced, corporate 
income tax rates would become the leading tax ele-
ment in making investment decisions. This would 
eliminate tax base differences in the European Un-
ion. Member states would be faced with increased 
pressure on their corporate income tax rates. High 
rates could no longer be compensated through bet-
ter accounting and tax rules. The transfer of income 
by way of accounting prices and debt financing 
would no longer be possible in the CCCTB system. 
A common tax base would lead to companies hav-
ing a transparent tax burden. As a result, the tax 
competition within EU Member States would in-
tensify due to corporate income tax rates.
3. Methodology for calculating the formula 
apportionment
According to Fuest, Hemmelgarn and Ramb (2006: 
20), the revenue effects of the introduction of the 
formula apportionment discussion in the EU in-
clude a system of cross-border loss relief. They also 
found an expected decrease in the tax revenues of 
EU Member States. Choosing the apportionment 
formula is important for two reasons (Bettendorf 
et al., 2010: 454). Firstly, the formula determines 
the distribution of the tax base across jurisdictions. 
Secondly, the formula apportionment imposes 
an implicit excise tax on the apportionment fac-
tor. Companies can influence their corporate tax 
liability by locating the factors that enter the for-
mula in low-tax jurisdictions. As long as tax rates 
differ across jurisdictions, the allocation of invest-
ment and employment will be influenced based 
on the formula apportionment. Corporate income 
taxation is based on a consolidated tax base, and 
tax revenues are apportioned among countries ac-
cording to the formula (Pethig and Wagener, 2007: 
633). Based on the formula apportionment, a mul-
tinational would report its EU-wide taxable income 
to every EU country in which it is active and this 
income would be allocated among each EU country 
for tax purposes based on a formula that could use 
a variety of relative cost and revenue ratios (Gresik, 
2010: 134). A multinational company′s global in-
come would be assigned to countries by a formula 
based on the fraction of their worldwide activity 
that occurred in each country (Clausing and Lahav, 
2011: 99).
Within this taxation system international com-
panies would be allowed to cover their losses on 
the EU level. Incomes and losses of one group of 
companies would not be separated by countries in 
which certain subsidiaries from a group are located. 
Instead, all taxable losses and incomes would be 
consolidated at the beginning. By doing so, spillover 
among particular companies from a group would 
become pointless. Taxable profit would be firstly 
governed by common rules. All parts of the group 
would be consolidated and the group profit would 
be allocated by formula apportionment to differ-
ent member states. The corporate tax rate would 
be agreed upon according to a single taxing system. 
The apportionment formula includes three factors. 
These factors are Sales (S), Labour (L) and Assets 
(A). The labour factor is divided into two factors. 
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These factors are the payroll of the work force and 
the number of employees. According to Article 86 
(COM, 2011: 47) the apportionment formula:
Share A=
(1)
with CTB representing the consolidated overall re-
sults of the group.
Equation (1) shows a system according to which 
distributed tax base would be located in different 
Member States.
The choice of apportionment factors of a formula 
should follow the objectives according to which the 
formula should (CCCTB, 2007: 5):
1. Be as simple as possible to apply for taxpayers 
and tax administrations and easy to audit for tax 
administrations,
2. Be difficult to manipulate by the taxpayers;
3. Be considered to lead to a fair and equitable 
distribution of the tax bases among the various 
entities concerned;
4. Not lead to undesirable effects in terms of tax 
competition.
The apportionment formula can only allocate a 
share of the consolidated group income to the 
group entity that equals the group entity′s pre-con-
solidation income if all used apportionment factors 
are uniformly distributed between the group entity 
and the corporate group (Petutsching, 2010: 23).
A soon as Croatia joins the EU, each Member State 
will have the right to tax the allocated share of the 
consolidated tax base by applying its own national 
corporate tax base.
A multinational company consists of Company A 
and Company B. Company A resides and sells its 
output in Croatia, and Company B resides and sells 
its output in Slovenia. Information about sales, pay-
roll, employees and assets for both countries are 
provided in Table 2. Corporate income tax rate for 
Slovenia in 2013 is 17% and for Croatia it is 20%.
Table 2 Formula apportionment application




(Company A) 50 50 50 40
Slovenia 
(Company B) 70 30 30 50
Total 120 80 80
Source: Author′s calculation
Considering the above information, the tax burden 
under separate accounting per company and the to-
tal tax burden for the group amounts to 16.5.
TA = 40 × 0.2 = 8   TB = 50 × 0.17 = 8.5       T = TA + TB = 16.5
Applying the apportionment formula from Article 
86 and assuming an identical tax base, the tax bur-
den per company and the total tax burden for the 
group amounts to 17.1.
This example shows that formula apportionment 
would significantly change the total tax burden for 
groups of companies. It may also provide incentives 
to increase tax competition. Increasing tax com-
petition under the proposed CCCTB may encour-
age Member States to further decrease tax rates on 
corporate profits (Spengel and Zöllkau, 2012: 14). 
According to this example, it can be concluded that 
Member States with a higher income tax rate have 
a higher total tax burden. This is one of the factors 
that adversely affects multinational companies’ de-
cision to locate their enterprises in those countries. 
By comparing companies in Croatia and Slovenia, 
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it can be concluded that it is easy for multinational 
companies to do business in Slovenia because their 
tax burden is lower. A lower tax burden allows com-
panies to earn more. Besides, they become more at-
tractive to foreign investors.
4. Implementation of the CCCTB system in  
Croatia
All rules of the CCCTB system should be imple-
mented in the Republic of Croatia, now the young-
est Member State. The application of the common 
consolidated corporate tax base would reduce tax 
compliance costs. By applying the formula appor-
tionment, this consolidated tax base would be dis-
tributed among Member States. By applying the 
concept of consolidation, multinational companies 
that do business in several member states would 
have to calculate taxes according to only one tax 
system. The use of a consolidated base would mean 
that the profit and loss of the entire multinational 
company are accumulated to a simple general tax 
base. Thus, there would be no more need for trans-
fer pricing and international double taxation would 
disappear. By accepting a consolidated base within 
income tax, multinational companies should be al-
lowed to calculate overall income by applying com-
mon regulations.
The expected results of the application of the CC-
CTB are as follows (COM, 2011: 15):
1. To allow cross-border loss-offset;
2. To reduce occurrences of double or over-taxa-
tion;
3. To reduce undue or unintended tax planning 
opportunities for companies by the parallel ap-
plication of 28 corporate tax system in the EU;
4. To introduce a one-stop shop approach for tax 
declarations and assessment;
5. To provide companies with the option to apply a 
common system for taxation in the EU;
6. To reduce transfer pricing compliance obliga-
tions.
Implementing the CCCTB system, Croatia will have 
a choice of implementing it as its individual tax base 
or as a tax base that is an alternative to the existing 
one. Furthermore, replacing the Croatian corporate 
income tax base with the CCCTB would cause nu-
merous transitional problems of moving from the 
existing tax base to the CCCTB for both Croatian 
entities and entities moving between the two sys-
tems. Domestic tax incentives would no longer be 
available to firms on the Croatian market because 
they are not deductible under the CCCTB system. 
Likewise, issues on whether Croatia should adopt 
the CCCTB as it’s only tax base or as an additional 
tax base have been raised. The probability of Croatia 
implementing the CCCTB as its individual tax base 
is very limited. A more realistic situation would be 
the one in which the CCCTB exists side by side with 
the national tax base. If Croatia does not implement 
the CCCTB, at least as an alternative tax base, the 
CCCTB will be treated as just another foreign tax 
base. From a Croatian point of view, inbound and 
outbound investments in the CCCTB area would be 
taxed in the same way as investments in any other 
foreign jurisdiction. That would be very confusing 
and economically unacceptable to foreign investors 
on the Croatian market.
5. Conclusion
The current situation in the area of corporate taxa-
tion in the EU is characterized by diverse tax sys-
tems, great differences in tax burden on companies 
in particular Member States and strong tax compe-
tition. For individual Member States, the benefits 
from consolidation and formula apportionment are 
diverse and depend on the formula choice. The for-
mula defines the distribution of the corporate tax 
base across EU countries and, thereby, the revenue 
implications of the reform.
The diversity of income taxation systems within the 
European Union causes interferences in cross-bor-
der business of multinational companies. Thus, it 
encourages shifting income to Member States with 
lower income tax rates in order to accumulate more 
profit. Besides having an adverse effect on the eco-
nomic growth and economy of the country, it will 
also influence the European Union as a consolidated 
market. In order to eliminate these problems, the 
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European Union has taken precautionary measures. 
Establishing the CCCTB system is one of the meas-
ures. 
On 16 March 2011 the European Commission pub-
lished the adopted Proposal for a Council Directive 
on a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base 
with which it wishes to contribute to taxation fa-
vouring economic growth as advocated in the Eu-
rope 2020 strategy. This prompted intensive techni-
cal discussions regarding the proposal at the level 
of working groups of the Council of the European 
Union. A common consolidated corporate income 
tax base is one of the measures serving to reduce tax 
obstacles in cross-border activities within the Euro-
pean Union. It aims to establish a system of com-
mon rules for calculating the tax base of companies 
resident in the EU and EU-located subsidiaries of 
third country companies. The common fiscal frame-
work provides rules for calculating the business re-
sults of each company (or subsidiary), the consoli-
dation of those results with other group members 
and the distribution of the consolidated tax base for 
each Member State in which the group operates, i.e. 
has established a company or subsidiary. Although 
some progress has been made with the proposal of 
a Directive on a Common Consolidated Corporate 
Tax Base, some Member States still have certain 
reservations and doubts regarding certain elements 
of the Directive Proposal. The implementation of 
this kind of system in Member States will present 
major challenges for the business sector. It will be 
a major challenge for Croatia as well since further 
modification of its tax system will be required. As 
a result, the Income Tax Act will be modified and 
companies will have to adjust to it. 
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Sabina Hodžić
Utjecaj zajedničke konsolidirane osnovice poreza 
na dobit u Hrvatskoj
Sažetak
Nakon pristupanja Hrvatske Europskoj uniji, 1. srpnja 2013., broj zemalja članica povećao se na 28. 
Različitost poreznih sustava unutar 28 zemalja članica uzrokuje smetnje u prekograničnoj djelatnosti 
poreznih društava. To potiče premještanje dobiti u zemlje s nižim poreznim stopama poreza na dobit. Cilj 
ovoga rada jest prikazati glavne značajke uvođenja zajedničke konsolidirane osnovice poreza na dobit u 
Hrvatskoj. Rad također prikazuje učinke mehanizma za raspodjelu porezne osnovice na trgovačka društva 
u Hrvatskoj. Prihvaćanje sustava zajedničke konsolidirane osnovice poreza na dobit, učinit će Hrvatsku 
privlačnom za strane investiture. To će također omogućiti stranim multinacionalnim kompanijama da 
posluju u Hrvatskoj što će doprinijeti ekonomskomu rastu države. 
Ključne riječi: fiskalna politika, porez na dobit, zajednička konsolidirana osnovica poreza na dobit, meha-
nizam za raspodjelu porezne osnovice
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